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1'r@blln and Hub1 tfl@if gomm@ftt§,time(there is zeroor low inflation), andpeople holdand
exchange its currency voluntarily. We refer to the other
country as the "soft currency country" because its cur-
rency lacks one or bothof those attributes: the value of
its.currency is deteriorating over time'andlorparticular
classes of people (typically, citizens of the soft currency
country) arerequired toholdsome ofitscurrency involun-
tarily, eitherthrough explicit savings requirements orasa
consequence of a commodity rationing scheme.
We compare the initial situation with a second one
which wecallmonetary union: intheformer soft currency
country, thecontrols thatforced residents to hold thesoft
currency aredismantled. The currency andcredit markets
areunited withthose ofthehardcurrency country. Inthe
process, theuew.consolidated government chooses arate
atwhichJhe o.ld, softcurrency will beexchanged forthe
new, single currency. Westudy howtheinflation rateinthe
unifiedmonetary system depends onthefiscal policy ofthe
new government. We show thatthereisarange ofrates that
can be sustained as equilibrium exchange rates, andwe
study thewelfare consequences of achoice inthis range.
I. Overview
or
where D istherealvalue, assumed constant overtime, of
that portion of thedeficit financed by currency creation.
Thisbudget constraint canbewritten as
H(t) _ H(t-l) p(t-l) = D















which decomposes the amount of inflation taxcollected
intothe product of the baseforthe taxand the tax rate.
When thedemand forcurrency isanincreasing function
ofR, theinflation tax revenue function f(R) (1- R) is as
depicted in Figure 1. As R rises from some low value,
f(R) (1- R) initially rises because thebase ofthe taxf(R)
rises faster than therate1- Rfalls. Eventually, however, as
R rises toward 1,thatis,asinflation falls to0,f(R) (1- R)
begins to fall toward O. Notice that, as a result of the
curve's shape, if there exists one tax rate thatfinances a
O+---.......,;:;---------~r----,
Inasteady state situation, Rt _ I = Rt = R, sotheabove
equation becomes
j (R) x (1-R) = D
(1) H(t) H (t-1) = D,
P
In this section, we provide a brief overview of our
arguments andresults. Ourreasoning exploits properties
of two basic relationships: a demand function forgovern-
ment-issued currency, and the government's budget con-
straint.
Inthemodel weuse, money isheld voluntarily byagents
to anextent determined by thereturn oncurrency. Since
currency does not pay explicit interest, the real rate of
returnoncurrency is thechange initspurchasing power.
Sinceweprefer towork with gross rates ofreturn (one plus
the netchange), wedenote therateofreturn oncurrency
fromt tot+1asR,«p(t)lp(t+ 1), where pet) istheprice
level att. We assume that therealdemand for currency ina
country isanincreasing function ofRt' whichwedenote by
j(Rt );thenominal supply, orstock ofcurrency attis H(r),
andf(Rt ) = H(t)lp(t).
A government can raise real revenues by generating
inflation, thereby imposing aninflation taxonpeople who
holdcurrency from t tot+ 1.The basefor thetaxisf(Rt ),
thereal amountofcurrencyheld,while therate ofthetaxis
1 R; The government's budget constraint at t can be
written as
34 Economic Review / Fall1990R (fe(R) + f w (R}}(1-R} ....
= f(R)(1-R}
0-+---""'-----------'---...---.
H(1) He(O) + eHw (0)





deficits, so that the deficit of the unified government is
simply D = DE + Dw. Thedemandforthenew currency
isf(R) =fE(R) +fw(R), sothattheinflation taxrevenue
is(1-R) flEeR) + fw(R)].
Figure 2depicts theequilibrium values forRandp(1)in
the new regime. Inspection of that figure shows that
whether an equilibrium exists in thenewregime does not
dependonthevalue oftheexchange rate e. Indeed, if an
equilibrium exists, there aremanyvalues ofecompatible
withthatequilibrium.'A stationary equilibrium depends
only on the size of DE + Dw relative to the maximum
height attained by the inflation tax revenue function
(1-R)(fE(R) +fw(R)). When a stationary equilibrium
exists,thevalue ofeinfluences thevalue ofthepricelevel
p(1): the higheris e, the higherp(1) will be. Thus, our
apparatus distinguishes sharply between the "level" and
"rate of change"effects. Thesettingof e is irrelevant for
thesteady stateinflation rateunderthe new regime, bute
does influence the "one-time" inflation at thestartof the
new regime.
In the remainder of this paper we use this model to
elaborate on the consequences of the move to monetary
unification. We study what difference the choice of e
makes,andto whom. We find thatthechoice ofematters
to easterners and westerners who enter unification with
either assets or debts denominated in either former cur-
rency, but that it doesn't affect the welfare of others.
Although the exact detail of who wins and loses in the
process ofunification may dependonourparticular model
(which is the overlapping generations model of Samuel-
son, asnoted above), thegeneralmacroeconomic features
H(1) H(O)
feR) = pel) = p(l) + D.
Thisequation canbesolved forp(l) asafunction ofD and
H(O). We can use Figure 1to pick off the value offeR)
associated withtheequilibrium R.
Ourmodel ofEastandWest Germany before unification
describes thetwo separate economies using two versions
ofFigure 1,onewithavery lowD, theotherwithahighD.
Thecountry thatrunsa lowdeficit D attains ahighreturn
on money R and a lowinflation rate. Thecountry witha
higherD attains a lower R, assuming itiswilling to allow
thepricelevel tobedetermined freely bythesupply ofand
demand forits currency. Laterin thispaper, we describe
some measures that a government can take to enhance
artificially thedemand foritscurrency. Usinga version of
Figure 1,weshallshow howsuchmeasures canbeusedto
raisethe base of the inflation taxandreduce thetax rate
needed to finance a given deficit. We represent East
Germany as having resortedto suchmeasures.
Our approach to studying currency unification can be
summarized by constructing a figure as thevertical sum-
mation ofthetwoversions ofFigure 1. Atsome time t= 1,
wesuppose thatthetwocountries opentheirborders and
consolidate both their currencies and their government
budgets. Thestockofthe new currency is thesumof the
old westem currency and theoldeastern currency multi-
pliedbyanexchange ratee:theoldeastern currency is, in
effect,exchanged forthe new currency at a rateof e OM
per OM. Thismeans that the currency stockinherited at
timet=1from theoldregime isHw(O) + eHE(O), where
thesubscripts WandErefertoWest andEast,respectively.
Wewant tostudytheconsequences ofalternative values of
e. The unified monetary-fiscal authority assumes the old
steady statedeficitD, thenthereare in general twosuch
rates.Forreasons indicated below, wewillassume thatwe
arealways inthe "good" equilibrium (withahigherRor,
equivalently, a lowerinflation rate).
For a single closedeconomy, Figure 1can be used to
determine the steady stateequilibrium value ofR, andan
initialprice level p(1) at some timet=1. First, the equi-
librium R isdetermined bytheintersection off(R) (1- R)
withthedeficitD. Then,given thatvalue ofR, equation (1)
written att= 1canbemanipulated toyieldanequation that





Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 35ofourresults, aremuchmore robust, because they depend
onlyonfeatures ofthedemand formoney andthegovern-
ment budget constraint that are embodied in Figures I
and 2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the basiceconomic model we use to
describe a closed monetary economy, and some of the
policy options opento the monetary-fiscal authorities. In
Section IIIweindicate which options areassumed tohave
beenchosenby the authorities of thetwocountries. Sec-
tion IV describes the consequences of a monetary unifi-
cation hitherto unforeseen and suddenly implemented.
Section Vexamines theeffects ofananticipated monetary
unification. Section VI examines anticipated unification
when thereisuncertainty about theexactterms ofunifica-
tion. Finally, Section VII discusses some qualifications.
II. The Model
Wewillbeusinganoverlapping generations model ofa
simple kind. Models of the type used in this paper were
usedbyWallace (1980), Sargent andWallace (1981,1982),
BryantandWallace (1984) andSargent (1987). Thepresen-
tation in this paper most closely follows Sargent (1987).
Time is discrete and starts at t=1. Each period, a
generation is born, which is destined to livetwoperiods,
andisindexed bythesubscript t; also,inperiod1,there are
agents called the initial old, who live only one period.
There is a singleconsumption good in each period. The
agents'identical preferences aredefined overconsumption
in each period of theirlives; these preferences are repre-
sentedbyU(ct(t), ct(t+1));theinitialoldhave preferences
Uo(co(l)). The vector of endowments in both periods is
represented bythepair(&7 (t), w7 (t+1)), where hindexes
the agent. We allow thepossibility thatsome agents have
differentendowments from others. There isnoproduction
in this model, noris there anyuncertainty.
Therearetwocountries, calledEastandWest. Variables
thatarespecific toeithercountry carryanEorWsubscript.
Each country has a constant population of size 2Ni for
i E {E,W}.Before themonetary reform, eachcountry hasa
government which cancollect lump-sum taxes onagenth
of generation t. After-tax endowments will be called
(<07 (t), <07 (t+1)). Ourintention istofocus onthechanges
in fiscal policythat will be feasible after unification; for
thisreason,weconsider thetaxschedule prevailing before
unification asgiven,andsubsume itintheafter-tax endow-
ments. Later, wewillanalyze departures from thisinitial
state.
Agovernment canalsoissue intrinsically useless pieces
of papercalledEast or West Marks (and denoted EM or
WM). The totalamount ofcurrency outstanding attheend
ofperiodt iswrittenHi(t). Theinitial oldinbothcountries
are endowed with an aggregate amount Hi(O) of their




Eachperiod, there isamarket fortheconsumption good
in each country, and the price the good in Marks is
writtenPi(t). There isalsoamarket forloans among young
agents. We willassume thatthese loansaredenominated in
Marks, andcarrya nominal interestratedenoted rt .2 The
real interest rate on these loans, by definition, is R, =
rtP(t)/p(t+ 1).
We assume that an impermeable separation stands be-
tween the two countries (a Wall), so that no interaction
takesplace between EastandWest. ThisWall was erected
before period 1, and is initially expected to stand in-
definitely.
We begin the analysis with a study of some of the
policies that the two governments can conduct. Forsim-
plicity, werepresent agovernment's taskas thefinancing
ofa constant deficit oftaxes withrespect toexpenditures,
denoted D ::::: O. A government can require the young in
eachgeneration to holda minimum amount A> 0 of the
currency real terms. The parameter A is a policy
instrument that is designed to influence the base of the
inflation tax.3
We willstudy twopossible regimes; inthefirst one, Ais
set equal to 0, so that constraint (2), below, is only the
traditional onewhich forbids agents to issuecurrency. In
the second regime, A is positive, and the corresponding
constraint isbinding. These options areavailable ineither
country, and this section sets forth the analytics the
context of a single, closed economy general endow-
ment patterns. We will later specify which regime will
prevail in eachcountry.
All young agents solve thefollowing problem:
max u(ct(t), ct(t+ 1) (P)
ct(t), cJt+ 1), l(t)
Economic Review I Fall1990This equation states that the net saving of generation t
equals the net dissaving of generation t- 1 and of the
government.
Equation (3)defines a one-to-one mapping between R,
and h(t) = H(z)/Np(t). We useittoreplace H(t) /P(t) in
where l(r)denotes the.amount lent(orborrowed, if nega-
tive) by the young agent, and met) the agent's choice of
money holdings.
Theequilibrium isthesolution totheagents' maximiza-
tionproblem, thegoverment's budgetconstraint, aswell as
anequilibrium condition in thecreditmarket.
Regime1:EitherA. = 0orthecurrency constraint isnever
binding










(3). Writing d=D/N, weexpress condition (3)as
f(Rt) = Rt-d(Rt- l ) + d (5)
Rt = r ' (Rt-d(Rt- l ) + d)
= <!>(Rt - I)·
Anequilibrium sequence {Rt},;,=I willsolve thisfirst-order
non-linear difference equation.
Thefunction <!> cantakemanyforms, depending onthe
utility function u. In thecasewhere u takestheform
u(ct>ct+ 1) = In(ct) + lntc.;1)
f is found to be
ill a,
feR) = T - 2R (6)
where ili = * W? fori E {I,2}, and(5)becomes
°2 R + 2d-ill-il2+il1 Rt - 1 = 0
t
which is shown in Figure 3. If0 1 > il2holds, thenfor
values 0 -:s; d ::; d* = (v'TI';" - -vTI;F there are two
stationary solutions forR(and forh),found byintersecting
thegraphof d+Rf(R) withthatof feR). Figure 4 shows
thefunction (1-R)f(R), andthetwo stationary solutions
canbefound foranydeficit d < d*. In thecased = 0, the - n
two solutions are l3 and1, where wedefine l3 = n: <1.
Underrational expectations dynamics, thelower gross
rateofreturnoncurrency, 11, isstable, while thehigherR,
isunstable. Anypathstarting ath(1)E [0,III (respectively
R1 E [ ~2 R]) willconverge to h. (respectively 11). Paths
starting at'h(1) > Ii(respectively R1> R) arenotfeasible











and theequilibrium condition in thecreditmarket is
h = _ H(t)
2, ft(Rt)-Nf(Rt) - ().
h P t
pet)
rt = lorRt~ p(t+l)
Agents' decisions canberepresented byasaving function,
which is thesolutiontothemaximization problem above.
Lettingf7(Rt) bethesaving ofagenth ofgeneration t, we
have
f7(Rt) = W7(t) - c7(t),
where R, = p(t)/p(t+1) is the rate of returnon money
holdings. Thefunctionjj willbestrictly increasing inRt,
undertheassumption ofgross substitutability ofconsump-
tionin thetwo periods. It should bekeptin mind thatthis
function depends on the after-tax endowment of each
agent.
Thegovernment's budget constraint is
H(t)-H(t-l)
D= () ,t>1 pt -
H(t) H(t-l)
pet) -Rt- I pet-I) .t>: 2
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Figure 5
inflation rate. Note alsothatthenominal amount offorced
savings per capita grows with time, since it is A- p(t).
Chart1shows theactual dataforEastGermany> Forthe
constraint to bebinding, wemustverify that
i\.::::f7(Rt ) forallhand .> 1,
which translates intothecondition
(7) d:::: (1-R)f(R).
eventually mean negative consumption. Hence R,isneces-
'1 . [n2 R-] sanym n' .
1
Notice thatthe comparative dynamics associated with
the "stable" stationary values Ii are in some sense per-
verse: an increase in the deficit raises Ii, and lowers
inflation. Thus, wecannotrelyontherational expectations
dynamics ofthismodel to focus attention ongovernment
deficits asacause ofinflation. However, ithasbeenshown
inseveral contexts, boththeoretical andexperimental, that
learning reverses the stability of the stationary points
(E., R) relative to the rational expectations dynamics."
Such learning schemes suggest thatweselect thehigher
stationary pointRasourequilibrium. PointRisassociated
with "classical" comparative dynamics: a higher deficit
lowers R, andthusraises theinflation rate. We appeal to
theselearning dynamics asourjustification for focusing on
theRstationary equilibrium.
Ayoung agent's budget setisdepicted inFigure 5:point
C is attained when an interest rateof 1prevails (in other
words when the pricelevel isconstant) whereas point B is
attainedforR < 1. The seigniorage function f(R)(1-R)
can be read as the distance Aw, when the lineAB has a
slopeof -1.
Regime 2: A- > 0, andthecurrency constraint is always
binding
We now consider a regime in which A- is positive and
binding.
Evidently, ifthecurrency constraintisbinding, h(t) = A-
forallt :::: 1, and
d = A-(l-Rt ) or Rt=R=1
d
A-'
Another condition must alsohold,namely, thatconsump-
tionremain positive. This imposes on A- thecondition that
A- < mAn (wf) = ~l'
which translates intothefollowing condition onR:
d
R<l- - = R*
~l
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Thus, the inflation rateis unique, constant, andpositive.








d = H(1) - H(O)
Np(l)
Budget set in Regime 1
Budget set in Regime 2
o
canbemadehigher(andtheinflation ratelower) inregime
2, aswesaw. Theotheristhattheinitialpricelevel p(1)is
higherin regime 1.
Toseethis, wesolve forp(1). Thegovernment budget
constraint at t= 1is
Inregime 1,theequilibrium condition yields
p(l) 0 1 - p(2) O2 = H(l)
2 2 N
01 O2 H(O)
P(l)(T - m;) = p(l)d + N
H(O)
p(l) = N(01/2- 02/2Rl - d) =
In regime 2, it yields
Np(l)A = H(l)
H(O)
p(l) = N(A -d)
Thus,aslongasthelegalconstraint onmoney holdings is
binding, theinitial pricelevel is higherin regime 1.
Thisresultcanbe reformulated in thefollowing terms:
suppose thatregime 2hasbeeninforce from t=Ion, and
that, attimet = to,thelegalrestriction onmoney holdings
isremoved unexpectedly, allotherparameters oftheprob-
lemremaining unchanged. Then, eitherthedeficit is too
highto be financed andmoney becomes worthless imme-
diately, or else it can be financed, in which circumstance
the actual pricelevel p(to) is higherthan was previously
expected, andtheinflation rateishigherfrom to onthanat






There aretwosenses inwhich wecanspeakofrepressed
inflation inregime 2:oneisthattherateofreturn onmoney
f(R)(1-R)
,,(1-R)
ThusR is bounded above, away from 1; furthermore, R
mustlie in the regions of (0, I? *) where condition (7) is
satisfied.
In the case of the logarithm utility function, (7) is
satisfiedif:a)d> d*, andthenitistrueforallR E (0,I?*);
orb)0 '$. d '$. d*, andthenit is trueforR E (O,B..) u (ii,
I?*). Notethat a) corresponds to values of thedeficit that
cannotbefinanced inregime 1.Moreover, inb)thereturn
on money R canbe chosen to be higherthaninregime 1.
Figure 6 illustrates this: the seigniorage function
(1-R)f(R)isrepresented andtheregion below thatcurve
isshaded. When thedeficit isd2, itcannot befinanced by
voluntary holdings of money. A solution with forced sav-
ingscanbefound astheintersection ofthed2linewiththe
graphof A(1 - R), withtheresulting rateR2. Ifthedeficit
is dl , it can be financed with or without the currency
constraint; with the constraint, a rate such as R, can be
achieved, which ishigherthanR. With alower value of A,
lower ratesof returnareachieved, suchasR3.6
It is possible, depending on the utility function and
endowments, that every agent would preferregime 2 to
regime 1. Thissituation isillustrated inFigure 7:pointAis
thatattained in regime 1, pointB in regime 2: theutility
level is higher under the forced savings regime. Thus
regime 2couldbejustified ontwogrounds, depending on
thelevel ofdeficit thegovernment haschosen tofinance via
inflation: that this deficit is too highto be financed with
voluntary holding ofmoney byagents, orthatthegovern-
mentcanimprove agents' welfare bymoving from regime
I to regime 2.




> 0 andR = ---2 < 1 s Ow '
1
Th~ constantPwistheunique non-inflationary solution, in
WhICh R, = 1. Forall othersolutions, R, = R, < 1is a
constant,and limt_>oop(t) = 00, Thesameargument about
stability underlearning, asdescribed above, willserveto
selectthenon-inflationary equilibrium, inotherwords the
onewiththehighest returnonmoney, We willconsiderthis




'h( h h)' WIt W I,W 2 IS
ht) miv(t) + liv(t)
C t\t + () :::: W1 Pw t
c7(t+l) < wh + miv(t) + liv(t)
t - 2 pw(t+1)
miv(t):::: 0,
Lenders are indifferent between holding money or pri-
vate debt, while borrowers will set m h (t) = 0 and
liv
f3(t) S O. Wf3
The government of country West is assumed to be
runninga "tight" policy: thedeficitis set to D = 0 in all
periods, andthemoney stockisconstant,H(t) = H(0) for
allt. Taxes are set so as to achieve this goal.
,Thisismerely aparticularcaseofregime 1,withD = 0;
WIth thelogarithmic utilityfunctions, weknowthatthere
may be two stationary solutions f3 and 1. Indeed, the
equilibrium condition is
~ liv(t)+miv(t) = ~ h _ Hw(O)
h Pw(t) h f w(t) - Pw(t) ,t:::: 1 (8)
and withlogarithmic utilityfunctions (8) becomes
nr Pw(t+l) nr Hw(O)
2" - Pw(t) T = Pw(t) , (9)
Thegeneralsolution tothisfirst-order difference equation
inP(t) is found to be
Pw(t) = Pw + (Pw(O) - Pw) ( ~ )t
s
Incountry East,appropriate socialarrangements ensure
that all agents ~eceive identi~al after-tax endowments ('VI'
'V2)' 'VI > "f2, III all generations t 2: 1. Agents within a
generation are identical in preferences and endowments
which implies that there will be no intra-generational
lending: eachagentchooses l ~(t) = 0,
Thegovernment ofEastfaces aconstant positive deficit
of taxrevenues withrespecttoitsexpenditures, sothatfor
all.> 1
GE(t) - ~ 1'7(t) - t 1'7-1 (r) = DE
with D,E > 0, It h~s chosen to resort to a currency
constraI~t, sothatregime 2 asdescribed above prevails in
East. ThIS means thattheequilibrium pricelevel pathisof
the form:
1
PE(t) = PE(1)(R )t-I
E
with RE = 1 - dE = 1 ~
'A NE'A '
HE(O)
p(l) = NE('A-dE) ,
Incountry West,N1agents have theendowment (a a )
hil l' 2 w 1e N2=Nw-NI agents have the endowment (f3I,f32)'
We assume that
a l > a2 and f32 > f3I'
which makes the first type of agents (indexed by Wa)
"lenders" and the second type (indexed by W(3) "bor-
~owers", A consequence of this assumption will be to
mtroduce some distributional effects of the events which
will happenin Sections V andVI. It is assumed that
NIa2 + N2f32 nr
= - <1 u.«, + N2f31 n1" '
which insures existence of equilibria with valued fiat
currency,
Agentssolve themaximization problem (P) referred to
a?ove and ~hoose to hold private debt as wellas money:
smce westillassume thatprivate debtis notindexed the
budget constraint of a young agentin the Westendowed
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We consider the following situation. At some date,
whichwerenormalize to t = 0, theWall separating East
and West unexpectedly disappears. The two countries
unite, andbecome provinces of a singlecountry. Thetwo
governments merge toform asinglegovernment. Thisnew
government inherits the streamof expenditures and pre-
unification taxes, andhasthe power to impose new taxes
onthecitizens ofboth(former) countries. Wewillassume
that-the newgovernment enacts the following rule: resi-
dentsofeachhalfofthenew country may move totheother
half, case receive an endowment of
(0,0).7 This ensures that distribution of population
remains the same afterunification: agents willnot move
between the two provinces, and they can be taxed at
different rates, depending onpriorcitizenship (that is, on
their currentplace of residence). The singlegovernment
also has the ability to issue a currency calledthe Mark
(denoted M). These arrangements prevail fort 2: 1.Atthe
beginning of period1, all West Marks are exchanged for
Marks oneforone, andallEastMarks areexchanged atthe
rate ofone EM fore M. Thegovernment chooses e, and
sets "A = 0, which means thatintheEastthecompulsion to
holdcurrency hasbeeneliminated.
Our purpose in this section is to describe theclass of
exchange rates, interest rates, price levels, and inflation
ratesthatareconsistent withthesenew arrangements. We
establish thefollowing:
1. If the consolidated government adopts the fiscal
policies of the two preexisting governments, so that the
deficit oftheconsolidated government issimply thesumof
thedeficits ofthetwopriorgovernments, itmayormay not
be feasible to effect monetary unification without fiscal
changes, depending onhowbigtheconsolidated deficit is.
2. If it is feasible for the new government to effect
monetary unification under a fixed policy that simply
consolidates thedeficits ofthetwocountries, then there isa
large number of admissible exchange rates. For young
people born at t 2: I, welfare is identical for any feasible
choice ofanexchange rate. Fortheoldat t = I, who bring
theiroldEastandWest Marks intothenew unified system,
the of the rate matters. Easterners are
better thehigherthevalue chosen fore.
3. If fiscal policy of the new government simply
consolidates andcontinues deficits of theoldgovern-
ments, themove to monetary unification raises the infla-
tionratein the West andmayor may notreduce it in the
East, depending on the real value of the constraint pre-
viously imposed. western lenders born at t :::: 1 are
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
madebetteroffbythischange. Western borrowers bornat
t:::: 1aremadeworse offby this change.
4. Theincreasedinflationrateimposed onwesterners by
the monetary unification can be avoided by reducing the
deficit oftheconsolidated government. Theconsequences
for different citizens' welfare of this deficit reduction
depends onprecisely which people's taxesareraised.
Thenewgovernment hasthe possibility todepartfrom
priortaxingpractices; anynewtaxes it decides uponwill
bedenoted T?(i) (tax onagenth ofgeneration t in period
i E{I,2}ofhislife).Theresulting after-taxendowmentwill
bedenoted w ?(i). Theaggregate taxburden ontheyoung
(respectively old)inperiodtisdenoted TI (t) (respectively
T2(t)). Our assumptions implythat the government may
forever tax young and oldin each (former) country sepa-
rately; therefore bothTI (t) andT2 (t) maycarryE andW
superscripts.
Theoldgeneration attimet = 1,whoareindexed 0, have
thebudgetconstraints
h m~HO)_
easternborrowers: CE(1) ::; e p(l) + 'Y2
western lenders: c~(l)::; m~(;(~;~(O) + &2
western borrowers: c~(l)::; m~(;(:;~(O) + ~2
The young in all generations will henceforth face the
following problem:
max u(ct(t), ct(t+ 1))
subject to theconstraints
m(t)+l(t)
ct(t) + p(t) :5w/t)
m(t)+l(t)
ct(t+l)"Swt(t+l) + p(t+ '
thesolution towhich isrepresented bythesaving function
f?(Rt) = (mh(t) +lh(t))/pit).
Thegovernment faces thebudgetconstraint
H(t) H(t-l)
D(t) = p(t) - Rt- I p(t-l) ,t> 1 (lIa)
D(I)= H(1) _ Hw(O)+eHE(O)
p(l) p(l) (lIb)
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D(t) = Dw(t)+DE(t) = (-TF(t)-Tr(t-1))
+ (DE Tr(t)-T~(t-1)).
Theequilibrium condition is, forallt ~ 1:
F/flt)=Nrfra(Rt) + N2fr~(Rt) + NEff(Rt)
H(t)
p(t) .
Thefollowing proposition is a straightforward applica-
tion of the Kareken and Wallace (1981) result on the
indeterminacy ofexchange rates.
Proposition 1. Given an equilibrium {Rt, pet), H(t),
(1' 7-1(t), 1'7(t) )h' C7-1 (t), C7(t),e}';'=1,joranyeE (0,00)
thereexistsanotherequilibrium satisfyingRt= Rt'l'7-1(z)
= f7-1(t), "7(t)= f7(t), c7(t)=C7(t), c7(t+1) =
c7(t+ 1)for allh; andii(t) "* p(t),H(t) "* H(t), for all
t, c3(1) "* c3(1)·
Proof:
Wetake as given thata monetary equilibrium exists; the
macron-bearing equilibrium, {Rt,pet), H(t), 15(r),e}';'=l'
solves (11) and (12). Foranychoice of eE (0,00),wecan
construct a caret-bearing equilibrium asfollows. Given a
choiceof e, combine (lIb) and(12) into
D(l) = F (R) _ Hw(O)+eHE(O)
1 1 p(1)




Sincethemacron-bearing equilibrium solves (11) and(12)
with positive money stocks, thedenominator ontheright
hand sideof (13) is positive, and (13) can be solved for
p(1). Then p(t+l)=p(t)/Rt' and (12) gives H(t) =
Ft(Rt)p(t). Since H(t) / pet) = H(t) /pet), (lla) willbe
satisfied. 8
One can interpret this proposition in the following
sense: foragiven fiscal policy {("7-1 (t),"7(t))h }';'=1such
that money has value in equilibrium, there are corre-
sponding sequences of "real" variables {Dr R t, (C7(t),
c7 (t+ l))h}';'=l' There is a continuum of price paths
{p(t)}';'= I(andcorrespondingpaths{H(t)}';'= 1)consistent
with these sequences, indexed byp(1); thechoice ofe E
(0,00) issufficient toselect theprice pathviaequation (13)
(which gives p(1) as an affine? function of e), without
altering anyotheraspect oftheequilibrium. Theexistence
itselfoftheequilibrium isadisjoint issue from thechoice
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oftheexchangerate, andisamenable tothesame analysis
aswas conductedinSectionII.Moreover, since thewelfare
of generations t 2: 1depends only on R, and noton the
specific pricelevel path, the choice of e affects only the
consumption oftheoldat t = 1.Forthelatter, eachchoice
of ecorrespondsto a particular distribution of consump-
tiongood.
When doesa monetary equilibrium exist? Figure 8will
be•helpful in this context. The seigniorage functions of
bothprovinces fE (R)(1 - R) andfW(R) (1 - R) have been
represented, as well as the sum F(R) (1 - R). Since-the
unified country will not resort to the 'A constraint, a
monetary solution is found astheintersection ofthey=d
linewiththe graph ofF(R)(1 - R). Ifthenew government
simply consolidates East's deficit without raising taxes,
thatis, D(t)=DE, then a monetary equilibrium mayor
may not exist. In Figure 8, the deficit d2 cannot be
financed,although itwas financed byEastunderregime 2.
Ontheotherhand, d1canbefinanced. The value d* isthe
largestdeficit thatcanbe financed.
If an equilibrium exists in the unified country, the
inflation rate will rise in West, simply because it was°
previously (Rw=1), and because R= 1 is incompatible
withapositivedeficit. Asfor East,theinflationratemay be
higher or lower, depending on the choice of 'A that was
made initially. For 'AI' the new rate of return R will be
higher thanR1, andconversely for R2 • It is alsoapparent
that,shouldthedeficitbelowered, theinflation ratemay be
made lower. How this affects agents' welfare, however,
willdepend on who is taxed to finance thisdeficit reduc-
tion.
Thus, if wecompare thewelfare of generations t <°
with thatofgenerations t ::::::. 1(andassume thattaxes are














Astationary orconstant-inflation equilibrium corresponds
to a=p(I), b=O or to a=O, b=p(l). In bothcases, the
path{p(t)} ";'=1isoftheform
1 .
pet) = p(l)(If)t-l, I E {I,2}
I
p(l) >Pw(l) ifandonly if
2HE(O)e >Pw (1)
NE('Yl -'Yz1 R;)+flz(l-1/RJ -2DE+r,+ (2+ 1/R;)Tz
andimposing (17) determines p (1) as
p(l) = 2(Hw(O)+eHE (0)) (18)
fi1 T,+ (fi2- T2)IRi - W
Thus, p(l) is an affine function of the exchange rate




Equations (14) and (15) imply a second-order difference
equation inP(t)
(fi1 Tl)p(t+I) - (fil-Tl+fi2-T2-W)p(t)
+ (fi2-T2)p(t-I) = 0 (16)
which, underaboundedness condition onD, has solutions
oftheform
pet) = a( II- )t-l + b( R
I
)t-l withRl > R2 ,
1 2
where a andbaresubjecttothecondition thatp(r)remains
positive, aswellas to theinitial condition






- Hw(O) - eHE(O).
Theequilibrium condition becomes
~fh( ) = fi1-T1 _ fi2-T2 = H(t)
h t R, 2 2R
t P(t) ,
andthe government's budget constraint
D = H(t)-H(t-I)
pet)
Remembering thatfw(I) > 0for lenders, itisclear thatthe
welfare oflenders worsens, thehighertheactual price level
is in period 1, and conversely for borrowers (inflation
benefits debtors). Whether they are betteroff than if the
Wall hadn'tfallen depends onwhetherPw=Pw(1) >P(1).
Theeastern old's welfare falls when elp(l) falls; whether
they are betteroff without the Wall depends on whether
epE(1) IP(1) > 1. Note thattheeastern old'sinterests donot
necessarily conflict with that of either class of west-
ernold.!?
Thus, toevaluate thewelfare consequences ofthemove
to monetary union, weneedto specify what fiscal policy
thenew government adopts. This fiscal policy will deter-
minethenew equilibrium return oncurrency R, aswell as
the the price level P(1) as a function of e. To compute
solutions for various fiscal policies, we return to the
assumption thatpreferences areidentical inbothcountries
andofthelogarithmic form studied above.
Let us consider the case where the new government
decides to tax the young of all generations and of both
provinces by anamount T1 = ~h T1 intheaggregate, and
theoldbyanaggregate amount T2 = ~h T ~, for t ::::: 1soas
tosetaconstant deficit D= DE- T1- T2 :::::0 for allt ::::: I
(recall thattheprevious deficit paths were DEfor Eastand
oforWest).
Welfare implications for the t= 0 generation
Wenow consider thewelfare implications ofmonetary
unification for the old at time t= 1. Forall save the first
generation, welfare is identical under alltheequilibria of
Proposition 1above. For theoldattime t= I, ontheother
hand, thereallocation effects ofvarying theexchange rate
are important, simply because they are exchanging their
oldmoney forthenew one, inbothprovinces. To seethis,
rewrite theeastern old'sconsumption inperiod 1as
h _ Peel) Pw(l)
cE(1) - "Y2 + e Pw(l) p(l) REfE(RE)
where PEel) denotes the price level which would have
prevailed had the Wall not fallen. For the western old,
consumption is
h _ . Pw(I) _ Pwp(l)
cw(1) - W2 + p(l) Rwfw(Rw)- w2+fw(l)
wesee that while western lenders willnecessarily suffer
(and western borrowers benefit) from theunification and
theensuing increase in inflation, easterners canbebetter
orworse off. Which way easterners' welfare goes does not
depend on the exchange rate chosen, but rather on the
extent to which they were constrained initially. We refer
again to Figure 7 onthisquestion.




NE ('Yj- 'Y2/R)+02(l-1/R;) 2DE +Tj+ (2+11Ri)T2
OJ O2
such thatp(l) > Pw(l) if andonlyif e> e*.
Note that e* may possibly be negative. But if it is
positive, andifthegovernment chooses e < e*,arelative
deflation intheWest" willtakeplaceinperiod1,western
lenders will be made better off and western borrowers
worse off thanwith the Wall. Conversely, for e > e*, a
relativeinflation willoccurinperiod1.This criticalvalue
of theexchange rate does notdependonthepricelevel in
countryEast(which is determined by A) butratheronthe
ratio of money stocks, on endowment and population
parameters, andonthefiscal policychosen. In particular,
thevalue e: = Pw(I)/PE(1) isirrelevant totheoccurrence of
inflationintheWestin period1,andto thewelfare of the
western old. However, e: matters for the eastern old's
welfare, which willbehigherthanwiththeWall ifandonly
if ele: > p(1)/Pw(I). The value e: can be thought of as
representing a "blackmarketexchange rate" atthetimeof
unification.
Wecanconsider afew examples: onepossibility opento
the government is simply to leave after-tax endowments
identical to what they were before unification. In other
words, the East's deficit is left intact and financed by
inflation, andT, = T2 = O. We thenrewrite(18) as
p(l) = 2 Hw(O) + eHE(O)
ill - o'2/Ri - 2DE
Thecriticalvalue is
Hw(O) NE('Yl-'Y2/R;) + 02(1 IIRJ - 2DE er= ----=-.:....:----'-'=----'--;::----=-;:::---'-----..::::.
HE(0) 0,1 - 0,2
Another possibility is for the government to tax onlythe
young of each generation so that T2= 0, in which case
*. _ Hw(O)
e (T1) - HE(O) x
NE'Yl-NE'Y2/ Ri (T1)+02(1-11Ri (T1)) - 2DE+ T1
°1-°2
We must keep in mind that R, will change with T1• If
T1=D, which corresponds to a balanced budget policy,
thenR= 1orR= 02 / 0,1.
These examples illustrate theway inwhichthegovernment
has the ability to choose an initial inflation or deflation
(i.e.,p(1)>Pw(1)orP(1) < Pw(l)), onceithaschosen a
fiscal policy.
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whichis thensolved forPw(T - 1) as a function ofP (T).
Young agentsofprevious generations I 'S: t 'S: T- 1willbe
solving the same problem, and the path {Pw(l), ... ,
Theyoung ofgeneration T- 1intheWest willthusface
problem (P):
max U (CT-1(T-l), CT- 1(T))
subjectto theconstraints
m(T- 1)+I(T- 1)
CT_1(T- 1)+ Pw(T-1) ':::;w1
m (T- 1)+I(T- I)
CT- 1(T):9i>2+ P ,
the solution to which is again represented by the saving
functionf~_1 (Pw(T-l) /P(T)). Theequilibrium condi-
tioncan thenbe written
Wenow examine theconsequences of a delay between
the announcement of monetary unification and the time
at which it is implemented. We make the following as-
sumptions.
All arrangements described in the first paragraph of
Section IV are announced at time I to be prevailing for
t?:- T. Inperiods t= 1, ... ,T-1,thesamearrangements as
before are maintained, that is, both countries remain
separate, government spending and taxes are unchanged,
East stillimposes savings restrictions, and soon.
We assume that at t=1 a fiscal policy is specified
for periods t?-T, by which we mean that {(T7-1(t),
T 7(t))h}';'= Tareannounced; aratee, atwhich EastMarks
willbereceived att= Tinexchange fornewMarks, isalso
announced at t= 1. Agents can therefore compute the
equilibrium allocations andpricepaths.
AttimeT, everything willproceed exactly asinSection
IV; E andWsubscripts willdisappear, theoldof genera-
tionT- 1willexchange theirmonies formint-fresh Marks,
markets will open, a price level P(T) (which can be
computedgiven the fiscal parameters) willprevail.
h Pw(T-1) _ Hw(O)
f fT-l ( p(T) ) - Pw(T-1) (19)
44 Economic Review / Fall1990Clearly, if p (T) = Pw, then the price level remains
constant, and if p (T) < Pw the price level will fall
increasingly rapidly asT approaches.
It should alsobenoted thatthevalue ofp (T)determines
which path of price levels will prevail in the period
t= 1,... , T, andtherefore theinterest rateswhich agents
ofgenerations 1toTface. Thismeans thatthechoice ofthe
exchange rate affects therealallocations of all agents in
generations 1toT, thesame way consumption oftheoldat
time of unification depended on theexchange ratein the
previous section.
Pw(T- I)} can be computed through a backward re-
cursion.
Inthecaseoflogarithmic utility functions, (19) takes the
form
fiF _ fiw Pw(T) = Hw(O)
2 2 2pw(T-1) Pw(T-l) or
Pw(T-l) = R;lp(T) + 2Hn~0) (20)
I
This is solved backward to give
Pw(t)
which is just another version of (10), with a specific
starting condition. Therefore, if p (T) > Pw (as in the
examples at the end of Section IV), there will be a
progressive increase intheprice level untilitreaches p (T);
andp (r) will increase atanaccelerating rateasunification
approaches. During thatperiod, theinflation rateincreases
butremains bounded above byI!Rs' Thetime path ofp (t)
isshown inFigure 9.The initial boutofinflation atthetime
unification is announced is
Pw(1) = 1 + ( p~T) - l)(R V-I
Pw(O) Pw s'
which isincreasing inp(T), and,givenp(T), isdecreas-
ing in T. It can be shown that R, > .5 is a sufficient
condition for inflation to be higher in period 1 than in
period 2, asillustrated byFigure 9.
Figure 9
o "1 T
VI. Anticipated Unification with Uncertainty
We now adda new wrinkle to the previous set-up, by
introducing some uncertainty over theexchange ratetobe
chosen attime T.
At time 1, the same announcements are made as in
Section V: the two countries will unite at time T, a
consolidated government will takecharge ofbothstreams
of government expenditures, and tax residents of both
provinces. A fiscal policy is announced, which supports
a monetary equilibrium. All parameters of the policy
are made known, except for the exchange rate e. It is
announced that the government will randomly choose
among n possible exchange rates (el , ... , en)' with
probabilities ('ITI'... , 'ITn) where 2,i'ITi=1. The choice
willbemade atthebeginning ofperiod T. These induce n
states of the world in period T. There is no other uncer-
tainty.
AsProposition 1makes clear, theinformation available
to agents allows them to compute the equilibrium se-
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
quences of consumptions and interest rates, for t ~ T,
which willbeidentical inallstates oftheworld. The price
andmoney stock sequences, however, willdepend onthe
(random) exchange rate: in particular, n possible price
levels may prevail in period T, namely (PI (T), ... ,
Pn(T)), computed from el ande2 byusing (13):
Hw(T)+eiHE(T) .
Pi(T) = FT(RT)-D(T) for I = 1,... , n.
The probabilities attached to the price levels are ('ITI'... ,
'ITn)' Itismore helpful tothinkofthisdistributioninterms
of the value money may have in each state, thatis, the
reciprocals ofthepricelevels (lIPI(T), ..·, lIPn(T)).
We willassume thatagents maximize expected utility,
andthatutility is additively separable, oftheform
u(c(t), c(t+1)) = u(c(t)) + u(c(t+1)).





c7(T) = .....! ch(T-I). (30.i)
qi
When thesevalues are substituted into (26) wefind
wh wh
ch(T-I) = -2
1 + Z (31)
2R T - 1
Equation (29)becomes
1 ° I ch(T-I)=-2 (01+ R Z
h T-1
2H(0) O2 = 0 1 - -~-
p(T-I) RT- 1
Thisequation relates p(T-I) andRT- 1.
We can use (28) and(30) to obtain
I ch(T-I) = ~ I c!J(T)
h 'IT
i h I
qi ( H (0) + n ) -!1L H (0)
'IT i Pi (T) 2 - 'IT j (pj(T)





anduse (22)to solve forqiasfunctions ofRT-1:
1 ki Pi(T) .
qi =-R "'IJ k, .(T) for l = 1,... ,n (33)
T - 1 "'J= 1 J PJ
We then invoke (23) to obtain another relation between
p(T-I) andRT- 1:
p(T-I) = pRT - 1 (34)
Once p(T-I) and RT-1 are solved for using these
equations, the next steps are identical to those taken in
Section V. An agent of generation T- 2 faces a pair
of prices (P(T-2), p(T-I» and an interestrate RT- Z
(which must equalP(T- 2)/P(T- 1) to preclude arbi-
trage).Hissaving function canbederived thesameway as
before, equilibrium willimpose
h p(T-2) _ H(O)
~ iT-z(p(T-I) ) - p(T-2)
which allows us to compute p (T - 2) given p (T -1), and
soforthtop(l). Theonlygeneration toface uncertainty is
generation T-1.











fi . = 1 'IT i '( h(T»= '( h(T-I» (27) or l , ... , n u c i U C •
qi
Equations (26-27) describe eachagent'sbehavior.
Themarket-clearing conditions onallfinancial markets
~ s!J = H(O)
h=l I Pi(T)
can be written in theform
~ h _ h _ H(O)
it (ci(T) wz) - Pi(T)
H(O)
I
h (co1-ch(T- I» = -----c:::--~
p(T-I)
i wh
ch(T - 1)+ I q.c!J(T) < co h + Z
i=1 I 1 - 1 RT-1
Thefirstorderconditions are (26) and
subjectto theconstraints
Equation(29) isredundant butconvenient. Equilibrium is
characterized byconditions (26-28).
c !J(T)< W h+s !J
1 - Z I
Note that the agent now has n+I budget constraints,
whichcanbeconsolidated intoa singlebudgetconstraint
Money istherefore oneoftheassetsavailable to theagent
forpurposes oftransfering wealth across timeandstates of
the world.
Wewillagainproceed bybackward recursion, starting
from thegeneration bornrightbefore unification, at time
T- 1.Theproblem solved byanagentofgeneration T- 1
will be
maxE{u(ch(T-I» + u(ch(T»} = u(ch(T-l)
generation T- 1 can be represented by n markets for
claimsononeunitofconsumption instatei. We denote qi
as theprices oftheseclaims,ands7asthequantity ofsuch
claims bought(or sold)by the agent. Thepriceof a real
loan andthepriceof a nominal loancanbe derived from
these n securities prices as
n 1
I q. =-- (22)
i=l I RT - 1
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n
> (.I kp.(T)-1
1= I I I
withpbeing thezero-inflation price level prevailing before
t=O.
We establish thefollowing result:
n
j~l(cxj-a)if(cxj) - f(a» < 0
n n
j~l(cxj-Ci)if(cxj) i~171'J(cxJ) < 0
n n
j~1 cxjf(cxj) - a( i~1 71'i f(cxi» < 0
Proof:
The lemma establishes that p > P(T). From (35), it is
apparentthatP(F- 1)>P(F- 1), andfrom (34)thatRT - 1
<R T-I' Since equation (36)describes bothpaths ofprice
levelsinbothequilibria, itmustbethatP(t)>P(r) for 1-:;t
:5F- 2 as well. Asfortheratesofreturn,
Pt-I P+ (P(F-l)-p)(!1I/!1zy-T
R; = --p; = P + (P(F-l)-p)(!11/!1z)t-T+I
and!111!1z> 1ensures theresult.
Theproposition confirms whatintuition might suggest:
wecompare aworld where money willhave acertain value
attimeT, to one where the future value of 1ll0ney is
uncertain, butonaverage thesame. Inotherwords, inthe
second situation wehave introduced some randomness in
thevalue ofmoney, around agiven mean. Thesamewaya
risk-averse agentwillprefer to receive withcertainty the
meanvalue ofalottery, ratherthanthelottery itself, wefind
that in our model the demand for money (which is
Weare now in a position to compare two possible
policies. First, the government may announce a non-
deg.enerate distribution of possible exchange rates (e1,
71'/; .•.;en, 71'n). This distribution induces adistribution of
pricelevels(PI (F), 71'1;' .• ;Pn(T), 71'n)' andadistribution
of values of.money (IIPl(T), 71'1;"'; IIPn(T), 71'n)' We
callthe mean value of money E(11P(T» = Ir=l
71'Jpi (F). This results intheequilibrium sequence {p(I),
RI,..., p(F-l), RT- 1} which we just computed, and
which wecalltheequilibrium underuncertainty.
Alternatively, thegovernment, exactly as in Section V,
may announce thatanexchange rateewillbechosen with
certainty at time F: we denote {p(1), RjI"" p(F-I),
R T - 1, p(F)} the corresponding equilibrium sequence,
which we call the equilibrium undercertainty forshort.
We consider the case where e is such that lip(F) =
E(lIp(F».
Thelemma implies:
Proposition 2. Assume logarithmic utilityfunctions. In
the equilibrium under uncertainty, the price levels for
t=1,... , F- 1arehigher, and the rates ofreturn lower,






p = .I ( ----;;::,.---::-- )pi (F).
1= I
n 71'. n n
(i~1 Pi(!> )(i~1 kiPi(F» > i~/i
n 1 n Pi(T)
(i~1 71'i Pi(T) )( i~1 71'i H(O) + !1zpJF) )
n 1 p.(F) > I 71'.-- .........,~::...:l~~~
i=1 I Pi(T) H(O) + !1zPi(F)
if we denoteo, 11Pi (T), a = Ir=I cxi andf( x) =
11 (H(O)+!1zx), wewantto prove
Lemma. In thelogarithmic utility case, for anydistribu-
tion (PI (T), 71'1; ... ;Pn(T), 71'n), thefollowing holds:
1
p > (E P(F) )- 1.
Proof:
We wish to prove that
n n n
(i~l71'iCXJ(i~I71'J(CXi» > (i~l71'iCXif(cxJ);
Note thatf is strictly decreasing inx: therefore
cxj~ a ifff(cx) -:;f(Ci)
(cxj-a)(j(cx) - f(Ci» < 0 forallj
Equations (32) and (34) at last allow us to solve for
p(F~I):
p(F-I) = 2H(0) + !1z p (35)
!11 !11
Note theformal analogy between (20) and(35).This will
allow an easy comparison withthe caseundercertainty.
SinceP(F- 1)issolved asafunction ofthedistribution
of (PI (T),... ,pn(T)), the price sequence {p(1), ... ,
P(F- 2)} can be solved for recursively, using equation
(20):
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ments) willfall when uncertainty is introduced. Theprice
level, andtheinflation rates, willbe higherin all periods
between the announcement and the implementation of
monetaryunion, because of the addeduncertainty on the
future value of money.
Theproposition is set forthin termsof distributions of
pricelevels attimeT, andisnotlinkedtotheparticularway
in whichrandomness isintroduced inthepricelevel attime
T. Other forms of randomness may be considered. Sup-
pose, for example, that the exchange rate is determined
with certainty at time 1 (e= 1, say), but fiscal policy
remains indeterminate. Assuming thattheaggregate defi-
cit can be financed by inflation, and thatthe government
willchooseto finance someconstantfraction 0 E [0,1] of
thatdeficit, the pricelevel at time T is givenby equation
(13), wherethedenominator F (RT ) - oD = RT F (RT ) is
positive by assumption, and decreasing in 0, as Figure3
makesdear. Thus the uncertainty over 0, if the govern-
ment does not commit to a specific value before time T,
willinducea distribution ofpossiblevalues of money, the
lowestoneassociated witha8= 0andthehighestonewith
a balancedbudget.
Thesame resultthenapplies: theaddeduncertainty has
the.effect ofincreasing the price levels and the inflation
ratesinallperiodspriorto compared toa
choiceoffiscal policywhichwould setthevalue ofmoney
1/P(T) at the meanof the possible values of money.
VII. Final Comments
Themodel weusedinthispaperhas,asanymodel must
have, a number of limitations. Some are the inevitable
drawbacks which characterize any overlapping genera-
tions model; theyarewellknown,andthisis nottheplace
to discussthem. Wemightmention thatthey oftenplague
other workable models of money. Weratherwishto point
out drawbacks that are specific to the model we used,
which should be borne in mind when trying to find
similarities between this model and actual persons or
events.
In our model,thecountry onceunified remains closed,
inthesamesensethetwocountries wereoriginally takento
be closed: thereisnorestoftheworld, andconsequently no
foreign trade. As a result, we lose the ability to discuss
consequences of monetary unionontrade, andwemissan
importantconsideration in thedetermination of theinitial
inflationary shock at unification. As some have pointed
out, the DM is convertible, whereas the OM is not. East
Germans endowed with hard Marks would presumably
buy goods from abroadaswellasfromWest Germany, and




and theseoldpeople, by construction, onlywishto spend
theirbalances.Although thedemographic structure ofEast
Germany isn't extremely different fromthatofWestGer-
many,12 in actualitysomeEast Germans maynot wantto
spendalltheirfreshly mintedDMonbananas. Again,this
reduces the strengthof inflationary forces.
Our model simply assumes that the new government
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converts all OM instantaneously into freely expendable
Marks, andata singleexchange rate.Theplanwhichwill
be implemented in Germany will not have this feature,
although anylegalrestriction ontheexpendability ofEast
German savings will have to be easily enforceable.P A
possiblefeature would have EastGermansbuythe State's
capitalstockwiththeirsavings; another would freeze part
of their holdings for a periodof time left to the Bundes-
bank'sdiscretion. Itis alsopossible thata fraction ofEast
Germans'money holdings willbeconvertible atarate,and
the remainder at another, lessfavorable rate.
We have assumedthat the good with whichEasterners
areendowed isofthesamenature as thegood available for
purchaseinthe West. Onemightobjectto sucha ruthless
subsumption of BMWsand Trabants as identical com-
modities, and wantto allowforless thanperfectsubstitu-
tion. Toillustratethe argument, the results of Section IV
can be re-examined with 'Yt ='Y2 =0, in other words
with the assumption that goods produced in country East
are considered worthless forconsumption purposes, once
agents are givena choice. Taking this consideration into
accountwould reinforce the inflationary factors. Wehave
also assumed that the Easterners' endowments would not
change after unification. Incorporating such a feature
would change conclusions about inflationary forces, but
would alsoleave Proposition 1unchanged.
On a theoretical level, one might object that we have
assumedperfectforesight onthepartofouragents,before
aswellasafter, unification. Butwehave shown ouragents
expecting the Wall to remain in place indefinitely in
SectionIII, andwehave thenbetrayed theirexpectations in
Economic Review / Fail1990Section IV (theelement of surprise was of course crucial
forthetrickplayed ontheoldpeopleattime1). We would
answer that we in fact assumed a particularprobability
distribution, namely thatthestatusquowould remain with
probability]-E, andthattheWall would come down with
NOTES
1. Asweremark later, thisresult issimply anapplication
andinterpretation ofthereasoning onwhich theexchange
rate indeterminacy result ofKareken andWallace (1981) is
based.
2. Models of this type usually specify that loans are
denominated in the consumption good (e.g. Sargent
(1987)). Adeparture from thisusage does notmatter ina
model with perfectforesight, such asours, until such time
asanunanticipated change inpolicyoccurs.
3. Itispossible tointerpret therestriction onreal balances
astheoutcome of a commodity rationing scheme which
forces the young to hold more money than they would
want by limiting thegoodsavailable forpurchase. Notice
that thescheme weuseleaves old agents free to spend
their accumulated cash balances.
4. See Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Arifovic and
Sargent (1990) for some theoretical work on learning
schemes inthe context of this model. See Marimon and
Sundar (1989) forsome experimental evidence.
5. "The growth of the total balance of savings is the
expression of the people's trustin thesocialist develop-
ment of the German Democratic Republic, and in the
stability of itsmoney" (DDR Handbuch (1979)).
6. The two regimes described here obviously do not
cover all possibilities. For a given value of the deficit
d1'S d*, and when 'A. is setas lowas 'A.2 inFigure 5,then
there are three stationary equilibria, one in which the
constraint isbinding with R= R3, andtwoinwhich itisnot
binding, withR=R1 or R=R2 . Thus, when thedeficitcan
be financed by inflation alone, imposing the constraint
does notnecessarily implythatitwill bebinding, because
multiple equilibria arepossible.
7. This assumption isnotexcessive, inview ofthe severe
restrictions recently placedon eligibility of East German
citizens forsocial benefits inWest Germany.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
probability E (the latter is understood to be as small as
usual). We would furtherarguethatthisrepresentation is
but a stylizedversion of mostobservers' probability dis-
tributions untiltheearlydays of October1989.
8. The allocations oftheold attime0 will beaffected by
p(1): at an extreme, for low values of p(1) the deflation
could be so severe that Western borrowers would be
unable to honor their commitments. In a sense, this is
irrelevant because theonly economic forces determining
theequilibrium values ofvariables arethedecisions ofthe
young Of generations t ::::: 1. However, agovernment wish-
ingto spare theoriginal old Western borrowers this pre-
dicament would choose ewithin a range (~, +00), where ~
verifies
Hw(O)+§ HE(O)Hw(O)+fiHE(O) = IfOi13(Rw)I
F1(R1)-D1 ~2
sothatold Western borrowers' consumption afterrepay-
ment of loans remains positive.
9. Avariable yissaidtobeanaffinefunction ofvariables
x1, X2, ... , xn ifthere exist constants bo,b; ... , b; such
thaty=bo + b1X1 + ... + bnxn·
10. Hadwefollowed the usual practiceof denominating
private debt in real terms rather than nominal terms,
western borrowers would have been unaffected by the
unification, and western lenders would have been af-
fectedthrough theirholdings of money only.
11. By relative deflation in the West we mean that
p(1) < Pw(1), that is, theprice level actually prevailing at
time 1 is lower than it would have been, had the Wall
remained in place.
12. One East German out of four is overthe age of 50,
compared to one West German outofthree.
13. This paper was written before the details of the cur-
rency unification were worked out.
49Data Appendix
Thefollowing summarizes some of the available data
on the German economies. Allamounts (exceptpopula-
tion figures) are in billions of local currency. Sources
are Statistisches Iahrbuch fur die BRD 1989, Deutsche
Bundesbank monthly report Apr. 1990, Encyclopedia
Britannica Yearbook 1989. 1
1. TSPis Total Social Product (the socialist version of
GNP, which excludes services, etc.). The 1990 figures for
savings inEast Germany andtheblackmarket exchange
rate arethe ones commonly cited (e.g. New York Times
March 14, 1990; International Herald Tribune Feb.10-11,
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